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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL T. MOORE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16672 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action seeking damages for personal injuries 
sutained while operating a radial arm saw upon defendant's 
business premises. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury in July of 1978. The 
jury returned a Special Verdict finding both parties 
negligent, but further finding that plaintiff's negligence 
was not a proximate cause of his injuries. The jury awarded 
plaintiff $110,000.00 in general damages and $34,892.00 in 
special damages. The lower court entered judgment in 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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plaintiff's favor and against d f d t e en an on July 28, 1978 . 
Defendant's motion for a newt · 1 r1a was denied by the lower 
court on August 21, 1979. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the J'udgment of the lower 
court and, an entry of judgment for defendant and against 
plaintiff, no cause of action, or in the alternative seeks 
to have the matter remanded for a new trial upon all issues, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Shortly before noon on May 1, 1975, the plaintiff and 
his associate, Charles Albert (Buddy) Prince, drove to the 
business premises of defendant Burton Lumber & Hardware 
Company in plaintiff Moore's pickup truck. [R. 643, 672]. 
Their stated purpose in visiting Burton Lumber was to ~y 
some odds-and-ends and to ask permission to use Burton 
Lumber's radial arm saw to cut several 2" x 4'"s, the blocks 
from which were to be used in finishing work at Foothill 
Place; a Deal Development Company project over which plain· 
tiff served as project foreman. [R. 644, 671-72]. Deal 
Development was a customer of Burton Lumber and had an open 
account there. [R. 645). The account, however, was only 
used to purchase minor items. Deal Development's lumber was 
bought from an out of state source and stored at Intermoun· 
tain Lumber, several blocks away from defendant's business 
premises. [R. 671). 
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Upon arrival, the two men entered the store. While 
Prince went about gathering the items on their "shopping 
list" plaintiff went to the front desk to inquire as to the 
possibility of using the radial arm saw. From this point on 
the evidence is in substantial conflict. Plaintiff claims 
that he spoke with Clair Bello, office manager for Burton 
Lumber. [R. 673]. Plaintiff maintains Bello quoted him a 
price per cut for the use of the saw. [R. 673]. The price 
seemed high and no set price was ever agreed upon. [R. 674]. 
Plaintiff testified that thereafter "someone" told him to 
check with the yardmen and if they weren't using the saw that 
it was all right for him to go ahead and use it. [R. 674). 
While he remembers speaking with Clair Bello regarding the 
price per cut for use of the saw, plaintiff does not remem-
ber who instructed him to check with the yardmen. [R. 783). 
Plaintiff's uncorroborated version of the conversation 
is substantially different than that recounted by the Burton 
Lumber employees. Testimony for the defendant showed that 
when plaintiff first went to the front desk he spoke to 
Richard Lindgren, one of the hardware salesmen. Lindgren 
answered "no" to plaintiff's request to use the saw and told 
him any cutting would have to be done by the yard people. 
Since he did not know what the price would be he referred 
Moore to Clair Bello. He subsequently heard the two discus-
sing the price. [R. 830-31]. 
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Clair Bello testified that while he did have a conversa· 
tion with plaintiff, the substance of it with was regard to 
the price to have the lumber cut, and at no time was permis· 
sion to use the saw even mentioned. B 11 e o, too, agreed that 
no set price was ever established. [R. 838-39]. 
The Burton Lumber employees all testified to the fact 
that it was a standard recognized policy at the yard that no 
one was allowed to use the saw unless he was an authorized 
employee of Burton Lumber. [R. 823, 829-30, 838, 848, 866, 
868) • 
Following the conversation with Mr. Bello, plaintiff 
claims he went out into the yard and spoke with a Mexican 
yardman whose name he later learned to be "Jessie". [R. 6751. 
Plaintiff claims the yardman told him that the saw was not 
being used and then led him to the, saw shed. [R. 675). 
Plaintiff noticed that the blade of the saw was set for 
ripping, whereas he needed it set for cross-cutting. He 
then offered the yardman a six-pack of beer if he would 
change the blade before plaintiff got back from Intermoun-
tain with the lumber. [R. 676). The yardman allegedly 
agreed, whereupon plaintiff returned to his truck at about 
the same time Buddy Prince came out the west entrance of the 
store. [R. 675-76). Prince testified to hearing Moore tell 
the yardman, "See you after awhile". [R. 647). The two 
-4-
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men then left the lumber yard through its rear gate which 
led onto Main Street. 
The Burton Lumber yardmen all controverted plaintiff's 
testimony. According to the testimony of Larry Hester and 
Jessie Garcia, plaintiff and Prince came out to the yard 
together and, after again being denied permission to use the 
saw, repeated plaintiff's version of the conversion at the 
front desk to them. Hester, who no longer works for Burton 
Lumber, told plaintiff that he would have to have an invoice 
and then the yardmen could do the cutting. Plaintiff told 
the yardmen that he had to go to Intermountain and would 
be back in a short time. Hester told plaintiff that he 
would check with the front office during the interim. 
Neither Hester nor Garcia remember taking plaintiff to the 
saw shed and promising to change the position of the blade. 
[R. 847-49, 867-68]. 
Shortly thereafter, the yard employees, including yard 
foreman Vernon Campos who had returned from lunch, heard 
the saw running and went down to investigate, arriving at 
approximately the same time that Paul Moore came out of the 
shed holding his bleeding hand. [R. 850-51, 869, 919-20]. 
After their initial conversation with Hester and 
Garcia, plaintiff and Prince had driven over to Intermoun-
tain Lumber and picked up the 2" x 4"'s they planned to cut 
into blocks at Burton Lumber. [R. 647, 677] · The two men 
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then drove back to Burton Lumber. Plaintiff claims they 
stopped at a small store on the way where they b ought the 
six-pack of beer promised to the yardman. [R. 647-48, 
677-78]. The two entered through the back gate and parked 
the pickup truck between the saw shed and an adjacent 
building in such a manner that only the end of the truck bed 
was visible from any other point in the yard. [R. 877-78], 
Plaintiff then entered the saw shed, measured the 
length he wanted to cut the boards, and drove a nail into 
the table to use as a gauge. [R. 650, 679-81]. He then 
started up the saw. Plaintiff claims he did not see the 
sign hanging up on the wall opposite the saw which said, in 
large yellow letters, "FOR USE OF AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL 
ONLY". [R. 786]. 
The radial arm saw at Burton Lumber had been in use 
on the premises for over thirty years without an accident. 
[R. 819]. Plaintiff's expert, Louis Barbe, stated that in 
his opinion the saw was "unreasonably dangerous" due to its 
lack of blade guards and a kickback guard, which guard would 
stop the saw from rolling forward. [R.621]. Mr.Barbe 
admit tea, however, that he had not operated this particular 
. 1 15 minutes on 
saw but had only observed it for approximate Y 
th saw move 
one occasion and, a ur ing that time, a id not see e 
forward any measureable amount. [R. 602-03 I 631]. Mr. 
-6-
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Barbe has also had no experience in operating similar 
radial arm saws. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, testified as having had 
experience operating such saws throughout his construction 
background. [R. 778]. While admitting that such saws are, 
by their very nature, extremely dangerous, and realizing the 
saw could injure him, plaintiff felt confident to operate 
the saw without any instruction or assistance from the lum-
beryard people in light of his prior experience with this 
type of saw. [R. 761, 779, 788]. 
While the radial arm saw did lack the guards described 
by Mr. Barbe, defendant's expert witness, Dr. Jay Hicken, as 
well as all of the Burton Lumber employees, testified that 
the upper hood guard attached to the saw could be rotated 
down until it almost made contact with any size of stock an 
employee might wish to cut. [R. 854-55, 914, 951]. As 
such, it is an almost impregnable guard. [R. 952]. Plain-
tiff testified that he was aware that the hood would rotate 
down, yet apparently chose not to make use of it. [R. 788] • 
Plaintiff had cut one 2" x 4" into 10" to 12" blocks 
without incident and had just placed the second 2" x 4" 
into position when the accident occurred. Plaintiff left 
the saw running while positioning the next board but claims 
he kept his eye on the saw blade while sliding the 2" x 4" 
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along the table. [R. 760). With his hand directly in the 
line of the rotating blade, plaintiff shifted his gaze to 
the nail gauge he claims to have nailed in the table, lO" to 
12" past the blade. [R. 762, 792). While looking at 
the gauge, he felt his hand come in contact with the blade, 
although he is at a loss to explain how it happened. 
In its Instruct ions to the Jury, the lower court failed 
to instruct the jurors that there was no duty to warn a 
business invitee in the face of an obvious hazard, yet 
instructed that there is no duty to warn a licensee in the 
face of an obvious hazard. [R. 325 I 327). 
The court also refused to submit either defendant's or 
plaintiff's proposed instructions as to the doctrine of 
assumption of the risk. The court's basis for its ruling 
was its opinion that assumption of, the risk has been statu-
torily swallowed up by comparative negligence. [R. 899]. 
Over objection, no interrogatory as to assumption of the 
risk was included in the Special Verdict. [R. 1027-28]. 
Furthermore, the court refused defendant's proposed 
instruction that the jury return a verdict finding plaintiff 
h 1 · was a proximate cause of negligent and that sue neg 1gence 
plaintiff's injury. [R. 398, 1028). 
Defendant properly objected to each of the court's 
rulings and now respectfully submits that the trial court 
committed prejudicial error in making such rulings. 
-8-
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The jury returned a Special Verdict finding both 
plaintiff and defendant negligent. However, they found 
plaintiff's negligence not to have been a cause of the 
injury, which conclusion precluded the necessity for com-
paring one party's negligence against the other. The jury 
awarded plaintiff damages in the amount of $144,892.00 and 
the court thereafter entered Judgment. Defendant's Motion 
for a New Trial was denied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY THAT THERE IS NO DUTY TO WARN IN 
THE FACE OF AN OBVIOUS DANGER. THE ERROR 
WAS COMPOUNDED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT 
UPON ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND IN NOT IN-
CLUDING AN ASSUMPTION OF RISK INTERROGA-
TORY IN THE SPECIAL VERDICT. 
From the outset of this litigation, defendant felt that 
plaintiff Paul Moore's actions in the face of the open and 
obvious danger posed by the unguarded radial arm saw obviated 
any duty which defendant owed him. In accordance with its 
belief, defendant presented ample evidence at trial (and was 
assisted by plaintiff's own presentation of evidence) to 
enable the jury to find either: ( 1) that due to the openness 
of the danger a duty to warn or protect plaintiff never arose 
thereby uprooting plaintiff's negligence action at its base; 
or (2) that plaintiff had voluntarily exposed himself to an 
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obvious danger and thereby assumed th · k f e r 1 s o in j u ry . By 
its action, the lower court denied d f d e en ant both theories 
of the case. 
A. The c~urt's ~n~truction on the duty owed 
a b~s1ness v1s1tor took the question of 
obviousness of danger from the jury, 
precluding a finding for defendant. 
At the close of the evidence, defendant submitted the 
following instruction on the duty owed a business invitee: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
One who extends to a business visitor or 
invitee an invitation, express or implied, is 
obliged to refrain from acts of negligence and 
to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises 
in a condition reasonably safe for the business 
visitor or invitee in the reasonable pursuit of 
a purpose embraced within the invitation. 
In the absence of appearance that caution 
or would caution a reasonable prudent person in 
a like position, to the contrary, the business 
visitor or invitee has a right to assume that the 
premises and the equipment are reasonably safe for 
the purposes for which the invitation was extended 
and to act on that assumption. 
The responsibility of the lumber yard is n~t 
absolute; is not that of an insurer. If there is 
danger attending the entry of the premises and the 
use of the equipment and if such danger arises 
from conditions readily apparent to the senses, 
the business visitor or invitee is under a duty to 
discover the danger. 
The Defendant lumber yard had a right to 
assume that Mr. Moore would perceive that which 
would be obvious to him upon the ordinary use of 
his own sense of sight and was under no duty to 
-10-
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give Mr. Moore, if he is found to be a business 
visitor or invitee, any notice of an obvious 
danger. 
[R. 417] • 
Although it is a proper statement of the law, the court 
refused defendant's proposed instruction and instead sub-
rnitted, verbatim, plaintiff's proposed instruction on the 
point: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
If you find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that, at the time of his injury, Mr. Moore 
was defendant's "business invitee" as that term 
is defined hereinafter, then defendant's duty to 
Mr. Moore was to refrain from any acts of negli-
gence toward him; to exercise reasonable care to 
keep the premises, including the radial arm saw 
thereon, in a condition reasonably safe for 
purposes consistent with his presence there; and 
to warn him of any and all dangers involving the 
operation of said saw which were known to the 
defendant or should have become known to the 
defendant in the exercise of ~easonable diligence 
and the performance of reasonable inspections. 
[R. 327] . 
The issued instruction is seriously deficient in its 
statment of the law, as noted in defense counsel's objection 
to it. 
Well, that is not a complete instruction on 
the law. There is no duty to give an instruction 
or warning to a man where the danger is obvious 
and he should exercise his own common sense to 
perceive what the danger is. I think the facts 
are here that he should have perceived and, as 
such--we should have--the court should have 
-11-
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instructe~ the jury that there was no duty to be 
warning him when they found the hazard was 
obvious, 
[R. 1019, lines 19-26]. 
Defendant admits that the jury's finding that plaintiff 
was a business invitee at the time of the accident [R. 1024] 
imposes a much heavier burden on the plaintiff to 
oversee 
plaintiff's safety than if the jury had found Mr. Moore to 
be a trespasser or licensee. But a property owner is not an 
insurer for even an invitee. A property owner's duties 
toward invitees are limited to those risks: 
Which are unreasonable, Comment f., Restatement 
of the Law of Torts, Sec. 342, Gaddis v. Ladies 
Literary Club, 4 Utah 2d 121, 388 P.2d 785; 
which he has no reason to believe such persons 
will discover or realize the risk involved, 
Erick son v. Wal green Drug Co. , 1 20 Utah 31 , 232 
P.2d 210, 31 A.L.R.2d 177; and which he has rea-
son to anticipate that persons acting with ordi-
nary and reasonable care will encounter. Tempest 
v. Richardson, 5 Utah 2d 174, 299 P.2d 124. 
Steele v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 16 1 
U. 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751, 753 (1964). However, one critical 
limitation must be added to this statement of the law. 
Where the dangerous condition on the premises is readily 
observable to the in vi tee, or is as observable to the 
in vi tee as to the property owner, the property owner has no 
b . 1 bound by the universal duty to inspect and warn, ut is on y 
standard of reasonable care under the existing circumstances. 
Steele v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Compar:t• 
Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867 (Utah 1978). 
-12-
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The principle that a property owner is under no duty 
to warn even a business invitee of an obvious danger is 
controlling law in nearly all modern jurisdictions, e.g. 
Sherman v. Arno, 94 Ariz. 284, 383 P.2d 741 (1963); Chance 
v. Lawry's Inc., 24 Cal.Rptr. 209, 374 P.2d 185 (1962); 
CeBuzz, Inc. v. Sneiderman, 171 Colo. 246, 466 P.2d 457 
(1970); Folda v. City of Bozeman, 582 P.2d 767 (Mont. 1978); 
worth v. Reed, 79 Nev. 351, 384 P.2d 1017 (1963); Romero v. 
Kendricks, 390 P.2d 269 (N.M. 1964); Buck v. Del City Apts., 
Inc., 431 P.2d 360 (Okla. 1967); Bluejacket v. Carney, 
550 P.2d 494 (Wyo. 1976). The rationale behind the rule is 
both simple and logical: since the duty of the property 
owner is only to warn or protect the invitee from hidden or 
unusual dangers, the duty is obviated where the obviousness 
of the danger serves as its own warning signal. Worth v. 
Reed, supra; Tolar Construction Co. v. Ellington, 225 S.E.2d 
66 (Ct.App.Ga. 1976). 
In line with the cited authority, the issue in a case 
of this type becomes whether or not the danger was obvious 
enough to absolve the landowner of any duty to protect or 
warn the invitee. But that is not the question presented 
by this appeal. The issue under consideration is much more 
limited; namely, whether there was sufficient evidence 
adduced at trial to raise the issue in a disputed posture 
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and mandate its submission to a J'ury. If h 
t ere was com-
petent evidence on the issue which raises 
a possible infer-
ence that plaintiff was warned of the danger by its open 
nature, then the trial court has an affirmative duty to 
submit the theory to a jury and not decide it as a matter of 
law. Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621 (Utah 1977); Powersv. 
~
Gene's Building Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977); 
Cf. Foster v. Steed, 23 U.2d 148, 459 P.2d 1021 (1969) 
(similar holding in a directed verdict context). 
The record is replete with testimony which would 
substantiate a finding that plaintiff must have been aware 
1 
of the danger posed. Plaintiff's only expert, Mr. Louis 
C. Barbe, testified that the cause of the accident was the 
fact that the circular saw did not have adequate safety 
guards. [R. 620-21). The fact is the machine was equipped 
with a hood guard which could be rotated down so as to cover 
the saw blade to the width of the stock being cut. [R. 820· 
21, 854-55, 857, 921). 
Plaintiff was not only an experienced carpenter but 
was familiar with the operation of the saw. [R. 778-79, 
1 In reviewing the record to determine whether the trial h 
' , d f a t IS theory tO t € court erred in refusing to submit e en an f 'act', 
J'ury it is important to remember that the evidence.oed.in · 
, h f e to be ex arnin and inferences to be drawn t ere rom ar F guson v. 
the light most favorable to the wronged party. er_ -
Jongsma, 10 U.2d 179, 350 P.2d 404 (1960). 
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788]. The saw shed contained a large sign which read "FOR 
USE OF AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY." Plaintiff did not ask 
for any instruction from any of the lumberyard employees in 
the use of the saw [R. 779] since he felt competent to 
operate the equipment. [R. 788]. Plaintiff knew of the 
danger attending the operation of such saws. [R. 788]. He 
was also aware that while the hood guard could be rotated 
down, that it had not been. [R. 788-89]. 
By his own admission, plaintiff was familiar with 
radial circular saws and their operation. As such he must 
also be charged with the knowledge of the relative dangers 
posed by a guarded or unguarded saw and, with such knowl-
edge, he is also chargeable with knowledge of the condition 
of this saw since its condition was reasonably discoverable 
by a man of his background and experience. At the very 
least, an inference of knowledge can be drawn. 
The fact of the matter is that this question, viz. 
whether there is credible evidence to warrant the submis-
sion of an instruction on this issue to the jury, has 
been rendered moot for purposes of this appeal by another 
instruction of the trial court. Instruction No. 20, as 
issued by the lower court, clearly shows that the trial 
court found that sufficient evidence had been adduced to send 
defendant's theory to the jury. That instruction reads: 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
The duty of the Defendant lumber yard to a l~censee is to not wantonly or wilfully injure the 
licensee and to warn the licensee of a dange d. . . rous 
con : t io~ of which the lumber yard knows and should 
reali~e involves unreasonable risk of injury to 
t~e licens~e and should also realize the licensee 
will not discover or realize the danger. 
If the licensee knows or should know of the 
dangerous condition of the premises or equipment 
there is no duty to warn him of the condition or' 
of the equipment or to make the premises and 
equipment safe for the use of the licensee. 
[R. 325). The final paragraph of this instruction is a 
correct statement of the law and is the same type of 
language defendant requested in its proposed instruc-
tion on the duty owed a business visitor. [R. 417]. 
The instruction clearly illustrates that the trial 
court found enough credible evidence on this point to sub-
rnit the issue of obviousness to t~e jury as it applies to 
licensees. As set out at length above, a similar limitation 
is imposed upon the duty owing an invitee. Whether the 
trial court's failure to include such duty limiting language 
in its instruction upon the duty owed an invitee is due to 
mere oversight or a mistake of law by the trial court is 
unclear on the record. But the fact that the trial court 
instructed the jury on the issue in a licensee context 
solidifies defendant's claim that the record justifies 
submission and supports defendant's contention that the 
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trial court breached its duty to submit defendant's theory 
to the jury; whether the failure was oversight or mistake of 
law is immaterial. 
It is clear that the trial court erred. But defendant 
realizes that the strictures of law do not allow reversal 
for mere error or irregularity. Rule 61, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The error must be prejudicial. This error 
clearly was. In accord with the authorities cited infra, 
the trial court is under a duty to instruct the jury as to 
any theory of a party substantiated by the evidence. Both 
the trial testimony and the trial court's instruction on 
the duty owed a licensee show that the burden of evidence 
was carried. The trial court's failure to instruct simi-
larly on the duty owing an invitee then operated to strip 
the defendant of a defense which could have possibly barred 
any recovery by plaintiff. The court's action constitutes 
fundamental, prejudicial, and therefore reversible error. 
Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326 (Ariz. App. 1978); Bradley 
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Goodson, 450 P.2d 500 (Okla. 1969); 
Wollan v. Lord, 385 P.2d 102 (Mont. 1963); Sherry v. Asing, 
531 P.2d 648 (Haw. 1975). 
The Utah rule is not contrary. A refusal to give an 
instruction (or portion of one) to which a party is entitled 
is reversible error if the effect is to: (1) mislead the 
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jury to the prejudice of the complaining t par y; or (2) 
insufficiently advise the jury as to the law. 
Ouzounian, 26 U.2d 442, 491 P.2d 1093 (1971). 
~ 
See a~ 
Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Co., Inc., 26 U.2d 448, 491 
P.2d 1209 ( 1971). 
This situ at ion is the hand for the rule's glove. Not 
only was the jury insufficiently advised as to the full rui 
of law, but the fact that the instruction on another status 
category contained a proper statement on the law could 
seriously mislead the jurors and lead them to believe that 
a property owner is an insurer for any business invitee 
injured on his premises, contrary to the actual law. 
B. Assumption of the risk is still a viable 
defense in Utah and the trial court's 
refusal to submit the defense to the jury 
materially prejudiced defendant's case. 
At the close of the evidence defendant also submitted 
a proposed Special Verdict containing an interrogatory 
on assumption of the risk and proposed the following 
instructions: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
There is a legal principal [sic] commonly 
referred to by the term "assumption of risk" 
which is as follows: 
· h olun-One is said to assume a risk when e v a· 
. · d rous con i-tarily manifests his assent to. a ange t danger 
tion and voluntarily exposes h~mself to ~har care 
when he knows, or in the exercise of ordinadytion 
would know, that a danger exists in the con 1 
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of the equipm:nt or premises and uses the equip-
ment and premises and voluntarily places himself 
or remains, within the position of danger. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
Before the doctrine of assumption of risk 
is applicable, you must find: (1) the person in 
question must have actual knowledge of the danger, 
or the conditions must be such that he would have 
such knowledge if he exercised ordinary care, (2) 
he must have freedom of choice. This freedom of 
choice must have come from circumstances that 
provide him a reasonable opportunity, without 
violating any legal or moral duty to safely refuse 
to expose himself to the danger in question. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
In considering whether Mr. Moore voluntarily 
assented to or assumed a risk so as to subject 
himself to the doctrine assumption of risk, you 
may consider his age, experience and capacity 
along with all other surrounding circumstances 
shown by the evidence in determining what he 
knew and what he should have appreciated about 
the risk involved. 
[R. 408-10]. 
The trial court refused defendant's proposed interroga-
tory and did not instruct the jury as to assumption of risk, 
even though plaintiff also submitted proposed instructions 
on the issue. The court's rationale for its ruling was: 
I [the court] think it is a negligence case, is 
what it is, a comparative negligence case. I 
think the instructions ought to be limited to 
that, excluding assumption of the risk which, 
under comparative negligence, is part of com-
parative [sic] negligence. 
[R. 899, lines 20-24]. 
-19-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendant submits that both the court's ruling 
and rea· 
saning are in error. Whil t ·b t econ r1 u ory negligencehasbeer 
swallowed up within the ambit of comparative negligence, 
assumption of the risk remains a complete defense when 
properly plead. 
Assumption of the risk and contributory negligence have 
long been recognized in this jurisdiction as distinctly 
separate defenses. Kuchenmeister v. Los Angeles and S.L.R. 
Co., 52 Utah 116, 172 P.725 (1918). However, just as an 
accident can give rise to recovery theories based u~n 
negligence, warranty, and contract depending upon what the 
jury decides the facts actually were, so may such an acci-
dent have factual bases which sustain the defenses of both 
assumption of risk and contributory negligence, thereby 
creating an area of overlapping defense. 
Many courts have been unable to distinguish between tr.: 
two concepts in these overlapping situations, resulting in 
much confusion. To a large extent the problem has been 
caused by loose usage of the term "assumption of the risk," 
for the term covers two concepts. Harper and James explair. 
the difference as follows: 
(1) In its primary sense, the plaintiff's 
assumption of risk is the counterpart of th7 'ff 
defendant's lack of duty to protect the plaint. 
from the risk, and plaintiff may not recover ~or 
his injury, although he was quite reasonable in 
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encountering it. (2) In its secondary sense, a 
plaintiff may be said to assume a risk created by 
def7ndant's breach of duty towards him, when he 
deliberately chooses to encounter that risk. In 
such a case, plaintiff will be barred from recov-
ery o~ly if he was u~reasonable in encountering 
the risk under the circumstances. This is a form 
of contributory negligence. 
Harper and James, The Law of Torts, S21.1, page 1162 
(1956) [cited in Calahan v. Wood, 465 P.2d 169, 172 (Utah 
1970) l . 
As stated, assumption of the risk in its primary sense 
is the counterpart of the defendant's lack of duty to pro-
tect plaintiff. Contributory negligence, on the other hand, 
is a matter of some fault or departure from the standard of 
conduct of the reasonable man however unaware, unwilling, or 
even protesting the plaintiff may be. Of course there will 
be many situations where the two doctrines intersect or 
overlap. 
Obviously the two may co-exist when the plaintiff 
makes an unreasonable choice to incur the risk; 
but either may exist without the other. The 
significant difference, when there is one, is 
likely to be one between risks which were in fact 
known to the plaintiff, and risks which he merely 
might have discovered by the exercise of ordinary 
care. 
Prosser, The Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) at 441. 
The distinction between the two defenses, as delineated 
by Professor Prosser, has long been established in this 
jurisdiction. As early as 1918, the Utah Supreme Court 
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noted the potential overlap of the defenses and the 
need for 
distinguishing them in Kuchenmeister v. Los A ngeles a2!9_ 
S.L.R. Co., 52 Utah 116, 172 P.725 (1918). Citing with 
approval the early English common law decision of Thomas v. 
Quartermain, L.R. 18, Q.B.Div., the court wrote: 
But the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria 
[assumed risk) stands outside the defense of 
contributory negligence and is in no way limited 
by it. In individual instances, the two ideas 
sometimes seem to cover the same ground, but 
carelessness is not the same thing as intelligent 
choice. 
* * * 
It needs no argument, therefore, to demonstrate 
that while in a particular case facts may be such 
as to justify a finding of both contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk, yet contributory 
negligence does not necessarily arise from intel-
ligent choice, and therefore is not necessarily 
included in assumption of risk. 
Id. at 729 (italics omitted). 
The distinction continued. In Clay v. Dunford, 
121 Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1952), the court noted 
the correctness of the converse of the proposition: 
Furthermore, plaintiffs' failure to exercise 
ordinary care to discover the danger is not 
properly a matter of assumption of risk, but of 
the defense of contributory negligence. 
Yet however clear the distinction may appear in theory 
d . 1. t . For many people the it has been muddie in app ica ion. 
• · f · k" was much easier to concep-buzzword 'assumption o ris 
d d · th abstract than would be the tualize and un erstan in e 
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dichotomy of lack of duty and unreasonable response. And, 
since assumption of risk and contributory negligence both 
operated as complete bars to a plaintiff's recovery, there 
was no pressing need to adequately distinguish between the 
theories. Hence the loose application of the term continued 
with predictable results. Some cases found the plaintiff to 
have assumed the risk when he failed to use reasonable care 
to discover the danger. In others, a faulty assumption of 
risk defense still was found sufficient to comprise contribu-
tory negligence and therefore bar recovery. In short, one 
man's assumption of risk became another's contributory 
negligence. The results were, understandably, confused and 
oftentimes irreconcilable. 
It was upon this backdrop that the Utah legislature 
authored the Utah Comparative Neg~igence Act. Apparently 
distraught with not only the injustices wrought by the Con-
tributory Negligence Doctrine, but also with the chameleon-
like manner in which assumption of risk became contributory 
negligence in many of the overlap cases, the Utah Legis-
lature attempted to remedy the confusion. By doing so, it 
engendered more confusion. 
The Utah Comparative Negligence Statute reads: 
Contributory negligence shall not.bar re-
covery in an action by any person or his 17gal 
representative to recover damages for negl~g7nce 
or gross negligence resulting in death or inJury 
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to person or property, if such negligence wa 
not as great as the negligence or gross negl~­
gence of the person against whom recovery is 
~ought~ but any damages allowed shall be dimin-
ished in t~e proportion to the amount of negli-
gence at~r1bu~able to the person recovering. 
~s used in this act, "contributory negligence" 
includes "assumption of risk". 
Section 78-27-37, Utah Code Ann. (1953) (as amended 1973), 
The question now arises whether the legislature intended 
to totally abolish assumption of the risk as a defense 
in this jurisdiction, or only to the extent that it tracks 
comparative negligence. The statute itself is susceptible 
of either interpretation. 
Plaintiff argues that the statutory language is clear. 
And, in order to give each word meaning, assumption of the 
risk (as used in the statute) must be held to include prima:: 
assumption of risk since secondary assumption of the risk ha 
always been equated with contributory negligence and would 
fall within the statutory ambit even without the specific 
statutory inclusion of assumption of the risk. [R. 545-461· 
Plaintiff's reasoning is in error. The language in 
question is operative even without including primary assump-
tion of the risk. A proper reading of the statute shows a 
legislative intent to clarify the lawmakers' position as to 
t . al enc 
a muddied area of the law and to prohibit any poten 1 
runs around the import of the statute by disguising contnt: 
t ·0n of tory negligence arguments under the guise of as sump 1 
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the risk as has been done in the past. Therefore, when 
given the reading contended for by defendant, the language 
in question is not mere surplusage as plaintiff contends 
but is an important clarification of legislative purpose. 
Plaintiff's literal reading of the statute, on the 
other hand, leads to an incongruous result which defendant 
contends was clearly not intended by the Utah Legislature. 
In its primary sense, assumption of the risk is a distinct 
method for showing a lack of duty on defendant's part to 
protect plaintiff because of plaintiff's own actions. If 
comparative negligence is now read to encompass primary 
assumption of the risk then the basic element of any 
negligence action--breach of a legally recognizable duty--is 
now made a mere factor in apportioning negligence, rather 
than in deciding whether or not negligent activity actually 
exists. Defendant believes plaintiff should not urge that the 
statute be read to produce such a ludicrous and certainly 
unintended result. 
Such incongruity results, however, when attempts are 
made to give statutes universal and literal application. 
When it is obvious such result was not intended, the statute 
should not be so applied. Snyder v. Clune, 15 U. 2d 254, 
39 P.2d 915 (1964). 
Instead, "where there is ambiguity or uncertainty in a 
portion of a statute, it is proper to look to the entire act 
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in order to discern its meaning and 1· t t n en ; and if it is 
reasonably susceptible of different interpretations the 
' one 
should be chosen which best harmonizes with its general 
Purpose ". G t Ut h St ran v. a ate Land Board, 26 u. 2d 100, 
485 P.2d 1035, 1037 (1971). 
The oft stated general purpose behind Utah's Compara-
tive Negligence Act is to eliminate the former harsh and 
often times unjust workings of the doctrine of contributory 
negligence. To the extent that assumption of the risk does 
nothing more than tract contributory negligence principles, 
it must surely be included within the act's coverage. How-
ever, the purpose of the Utah Comparative Negligence Act was 
clearly not to abrogate the defense that no duty was owed to 
a plaintiff in a situation where the plaintiff was aware of 
the risk of injury and voluntarily undertook to assume such 
risk. This was clearly not the purpose and legislative 
intent behind the Comparative Negligence Act, despite 
plaintiff's insistence to the contrary. While the subject 
matter area is quite complex, the legislature is presumed to 
understand the area of law within which it legislates and 
thus to use terms knowledgeably and advisedly. Greenha19.!! 
· al so presumec 
v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975); it is 
to intend that the statutes it promulgates will be given a 
reasonable and sensible construction and not one which 
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results in absurd consequences. Curtis v. Harmon Electronics 
0£;.• 575 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1978). 
Defendant's position is also supported in the case law. 
The Utah Supreme Court, recognizing the different concepts 
of the term "assumption of the risk" has specifically stated 
that the use of assumption of the risk in some cases amounts 
in substance to nothing different from a defense of contribu-
tory negligence, but that in other cases, the defense is 
entirely separate and distinct from contributory negligence. 
The controlling case in this area is Rigtrup v. Strawberry 
Water Users Assoc., 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1977). In this case, 
plaintiff-appellant Rigtrup contended on appeal that the 
trial court had erred by instructing the jury as to assump-
tion of risk after it had adequately instructed on contribu-
tory negligence. In affirming the trial court's action, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
Though there have been some differences in 
view as to the defense of assumption of risk in 
its relation to other aspects of contributory 
negligence, it has since time immemorial been re-
garded as a valid defense in the law of this state. 
It has sometimes been said to be but a specialized 
aspect of contributory negligence in that it can· 
be intermingled and confused with othe: aspects 
thereof in certain circumstances. It is also 
sometimes said to be something separate from 
contributory negligence, as it undoubtedly can be 
in some circumstances. 
Id. at 1250. 
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The Rigtrup case clearly holds that assumption of risk 
is still a viable defense in this jurisdiction. The issue 
then becomes whether the defense operates as a complete bar 
to a plaintiff's recovery or whether its component elements 
are to be weighed in the computation of comparative fault 
along with the component elements previously giving rise to 
a contributory negligence defense. While some dicta in the 
opinion suggests that the latter is the rule, case holdings 
suggest the former is correct. The Supreme Court held that 
the trial court in Rigtrup acted properly in issuing the 
assumption of risk instructions. Those instructions [R. 
491-46] establish assumption of risk as a complete bar to 
recovery in a negligence action where a plaintiff voluntarily 
assumes the risk of a known danger. 
This construction of the Utah Comparative Negligence 
Act finds further support in Becker v. Beaverton School 
District No. 48, 551 P.2d 498 (Or.App. 1976). In~, 
the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the Oregon Comparative 
Negligence Statute did ot bar the defense of assumption of 
risk absolutely. The court stated: 
We hold that the .•. comparative negli-
gence statute • . • applied only to assumptio~ 
of the risk in its secondary sense. The wording 
of this statute suggests this. As noted above, 
the statute provided: 
"Contributory negligence, including 
assumption of the risk, shall not bar 
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recovery in an action ••• if such 
negligence contributing to the injury 
was not as great as the negligence of 
the person against whom recovery is 
sought • • " ORS. 18.470 (1973). 
The choice of the term "such negligence" in 
the second clause of the statute required the 
term "contributory negligence" or its equivalent 
as an antecedent. Therefore, we conclude that 
the phrase "including assumption of the risk" 
was merely used as synonym for "contributory 
negligence," the words immediately preceding the 
phrase. See V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, 
160, §9.2, (1974). Since the statute did not 
apply to assumption of the risk in its primary 
sense and since the defendant pleaded assumption 
of the risk in that sense, it would not have been 
proper for the trial court to give plaintiff's 
requested instructions on comparative negligence. 
Under ORS. 18.470 (1973), assumption of the risk 
in its primary sense remained a complete bar to 
a negligence action. 
Becker v. Beaverton School Dist. No. 48, supra, at 502. 
The reasoning of Becker applies just as readily in 
Utah. Utah's Comparative Negligence Statute differs from the 
Oregon statute only in that the inclusion of assumption of 
the risk within the term "contributory negligence" is stated 
in a separate sentence rather than in a clause. Otherwise 
the language is identical. 
The Oregon statute has since been amended. It now 
flatly declares: "The doctrine of implied assumption of the 
risk is abolished." Or. Rev. Stat. §18.475(2). 
As pointed out in Thompson v. Weaver, 560 P.2d 620, 
623 (Or. 1977), the new statute abolishes assumption of the 
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cq 
risk as a basis for barring recovery. Th o 
- e regon legislaturi 
felled the doctrine in toto. However, the passage of the 
amendment itself would seem to indicate that the legisl~u" 
recognized that the pre-amendment statute did not aboli~ 
assumption of the risk except as it overlapped contributory 
negligence, in accord with the reasoning of Becker. 
The Becker-Thompson constructions of the Oregon 
Comparative Negligence Statute are clearly analogous to the 
case at hand. The court in Rigtrup recognized that an in-
struction stating that assumption of the risk in its proper 
sense may still act as a complete bar to a plaintiff's re-
covery is proper. The reasoning in Becker suggests that 
Utah's Comparative Negligence Act is as reasonably suscep-
tible to differing interpretations as was Oregon's. While 
a change in Utah law may, arguendo, be beneficial, such 
change is to be brought about legislatively, as in the Ore-
gon situation, and not judicially. This fact was properly 
recognized by the Rigtrup court. 
[W]e decline the invitation to so change our 
law. One of the important values in our sys-
tem which tends to produce confidence in and 
respect for the law is that the law as it is 
declared and known has sufficient solidarity 
and continuity that it can be relied on with 
assurance. We think that those objectives are 
best served by the judicial branch refraining 
from legislating any abrupt or dramatic chan-
ges of a substantial nature in the law and ~y 
leaving any such changes therein to t~e l~gi7-
lature, whose constitutional prerogative it is. 
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~gtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n., 563 P.2d 1247, 1250 
(Utah 1977) • 
Until the Utah legislature chooses to abolish the 
defense of the assumption of risk as a complete bar in a 
negligence action, it should be maintained and upheld by 
the state trial courts. The doctrine is not a confusing 
duplication of contributory negligence where properly 
analyzed, but is a separate and distinct legal concept. As 
Prosser states: 
Where the plaintiff acts unreasonably in 
making his choice, it is said that their [sic] 
is merely one form of contributory negligence 
which is certainly true; and from this it is 
argued that there is, or should be no distinc-
tion between the two defenses and that there 
is only useless and confusing duplication. 
But this is a distinctive kind of contributory 
negligence, in which the plaintiff knows the 
risk and voluntarily accepts it; and it has 
been held to differ from contributory negli-
gence which merely fails to discover the danger 
in several minor respects. Thus assumption of 
risk is governed by the subjective standard of 
the plaintiff himself, whereas contributory 
negligence is measured by the objective stan-
dard of the reasonable man. 
Prosser, The Law of Torts, (4th ed. 1971) at 456. 
Assumption of risk in its primary sense is still a 
viable defense in this jurisdiction. Therefore, as shown 
supra at page fourteen, if there was credible evidence from which 
a jury might draw an inference that the plaintiff assumed the 
risk of injury, the trial court committed prejudicial error 
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in denying defendant its instructions and special verdict 
interrogatory on the subject. 
In order to ascertain whether or not the record con-
tains evidence supporting an application of the doctrine in 
this case, it is necessary to understand the doctrine's re-
quirements. To be barred from recovery, plaintiff must 
encounter the risk knowingly and voluntarily, Johnson v, 
Maynard, 9 U.2d 268, 342 P.2d 884 (1959); he must look, see, 
and know the danger. Clay v. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239 
P.2d 1075 (1952). 
The standard to be applied is, in theory at least, 
subjective. However, our experience with the criminal branch 
of law has demonstrated the propensity for injustice which 
results where a plaintiff can absolve himself from fault by 
testifying to his own lack of knowledge. Consequently, ele-
ments of knowledge and intent are usually proven through cir· 
cumstantial evidence. A similar process has evolved in tort 
law, injecting an objective element into assumption of risk. 
A plaintiff is not to be believed when he asserts that he 
didn't comprehend a risk which is obvious. Prosser,~ 
of Torts, page 448 (4th ed. 1971 ); Renner v. Kinn~, 373 p,ld 
668 (Ore. 1962). 
In his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for a New Trial, plaintiff focuses his analysis on the 
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assumption of risk requirement that before one can assume a 
risk he must be aware of the specific danger involved. 
[R. 548), Foster v. Steed, 23 U.2d 148, 459 P.2d 1021 
(1969); McGrath v. Wallace Murray Corp., 496 F.2d 299 (10th 
Cir. 1974). Generally speaking, this is a proper principle. 
certainly one who senses the potential bruises and broken 
bones attending contact football does not, by his participa-
tion in the game, consent to be stabbed by an opponent; that 
is outside the risk contemplated by the rules. 
Plaintiff knew the rules attending the use of this 
piece of dangerous equipment. He knew its condition could 
injure him. [R. 761). He didn't ask for instructions. 
[R. 761, 779, 788). Lack of certain machine guards was said 
to cause the injury [R. 621) yet their absence was obvious. 
Use of the rotatable hood guard would have prevented the 
injury, and expert testimony said the guard's use was 
standard operating procedure. [R. 951-52). Plaintiff knew 
the hood would rotate, yet he made no attempt to use the 
guard, blaming his failure on a yardman's failure to rotate 
the guard for him. (R. 789); yet, he never asked the yard-
man to adjust the hood. [R. 789). 
Defendant admits that, upon the evidence, a jury may 
find that Mr. Moore did not assume the risk of his injuries. 
On the other hand, it may so find. The fact in issue is 
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that the lower court's belief that assumption of the risk 
had been swallowed up into comparative negligence denied the 
defendant the opportunity of having the defense even consid· 
ered. There was, at the least, a fact question for h t e jury, 
If the evidence shows that the plaintiff 
was aware of facts which might have put him on 
notice of a hazard, but falls short of establish-
ing an obvious danger of which he must have been 
aware, a question of fact for the jury may never-
theless be presented as to whether the plaintiff 
had a conscious awareness and appreciation of the 
inherent dangers he choose to encounter. 
57 Am. Jur. 2d., 676, Negligence, §282. 
The two principles discussed above--lack of duty and 
assumption of risk--are very similar in nature and effect, 
yet have been applied differently in concept. Defendant sub· 
mited instructions on both theories to the court, not knowin~ 
how the court would choose to characterize the defense. ~e 
court's failure to issue the assumption of risk instruction 
only compounded its mistake in failing to properly instruct 
the jury on the duty owing an invitee. The result was to 
completely strip the defendant of a defense to which it wu 
entitled. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY THAT PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE IN 
NOT USING THE HOOD GUARD AND KEEPING HIS 
HANDS OUT OF THE CUT LINE WAS A PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES. 
. 1 intiff 
The Special Verdict returned by the Jury found Pa 
th'1 
negligent. There is a great deal of factual support for '· 
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finding. It is certainly prima facie negligence for a person 
to undertake to operate a dangerous piece of machinery, in 
this case a radial arm saw, without using a guard provided 
for and attached to the saw. Further, expert testimony indi-
cated it is a cardinal rule of safety that while using such 
a machine, an operators hands should never be within the cut-
ting area of the saw and the operator's eyes should always be 
on the cutting blade while it is in motion. [R. 952]. 
In light of such evidence, defendant proposed that the 
jury be instructed to answer "Yes" to the special interroga-
tory asking whether plaintiff was negligent and whether 
plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of his own in-
jury. [R. 398]. The court refused the proposed instruction 
and defendant took exception. [R. 1028]. 
Defendant submits that the court erred in failing to 
give the instruction since upon the facts herein, plain-
tiff's action was, as a matter of law, a proximate cause of 
the injury and, indeed, could be found to be, as a matter of 
law, the sole proximate cause of his injury. 
Proximate cause has been defined as the 
cause next in relation to cause and effect. 
That which in natural sequence, unbroken by 
any efficient, intervening cause produces the 
injury, without which the result would not 
have occurred. That which is nearest in the 
order of causation. The last negligent act 
~ontributory to an injury without which ~uch 
injury would not have resulted. The dom~nant 
cause, the moving or producing cause, this 
cause must be an act or omission. 
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Toma v. Utah Power and Light Co., 12 u. 2d 278, 365 P. 2a 
788, 794 (1961)(emphasis added). 
There can be no doubt that plaintiff's actions fall 
within the ambit of this definition. Even if we assume, 
arguendo, the defendant breached a duty owed plaintiff by 
failing to warn plaintiff of the danger posed by the circu· 
lar saw, the accident and resulting injury could not have 
occurred if plaintiff had either: ( 1) made use of the hood 
guard, or ( 2) kept his hand out of the line of the cut. 
Plaintiff's placing his hand in the line of the cut is cer· 
tainly the nearest act in the order of causation. 
The lower court's error was compounded by the fact that, 
upon the evidence, the court could easily have instructed the 
jury that not only was plaintiff's conduct a proximate CGH 
of his injury, but, as a matter of law, his actions consti-
tute the sole proximate cause of his injury. 
The rationale for finding that plaintiff's actions con-
stitute the sole proximate cause of his injury is that his 
negligence occurred later in time. However, defendant 
realizes that the mere fact that one actor's negligence 
. lly . 
postdates another actor's negligence does not automat1ca I 
relieve the first of liability. Velasquez v. Greyhound 
8 (1961) "Butthis Lines, Inc., 12 U. 2d 379, 366 P.2d 9 9 · 
. . · f t on curring is true only if both negligent acts are in ac c 
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proximate causes of the injury; and it is not true if the 
later negligence is an independent, intervening sole proxi-
mate cause of the incident." Id. at 991; Toma v. Utah Power 
and Light Co., 12 U. 2d 278, 365 P.2d 788, 794 (1961). 
The distinction then is one of concurring cause versus 
independent intervening cause. 
[T]his is the test to be applied; did the wrong-
ful act, in a natural and continuous sequence 
of events which might reasonably be expected to 
follow, produce the injury? If so, it could be 
said to be a concurring proximate cause of the 
injury even though the later negligent act of 
another * * * cooperated to cause it. On the 
other hand, if the latter's act of negligence 
* * * was of such character as not reasonably 
to be expected to happen in the natural sequence 
of events, then such later act of negligence is 
the independent, intervening cause and therefore 
the sole proximate cause of the injury. 
Velasquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra at 992. 
It is certainly not "reasonably expected" that an ex-
perienced wood-worker would not only fail to use the standard 
hood guard on a dangerous circular saw but, in addition, will run 
his hands across the cut line of the rotating blade. In line 
with the afore-cited authorities, plaintiff's actions were 
the sole proximate cause of his injury and the trial court 
erred to defendant's prejudice in not so instructing the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The errors of law committed by the lower court cannot 
be brushed aside as being harmless. They are both substan-
tial and damaging. The court's failure to instruct the jury 
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G 
that there is no duty to warn a business invitee 1·n the face 
of an obvious danger, while so instructing as to the duty 
owed a licensee, resulted in confusion of issues and allowed 
the jury to find the defendant negligent for breach of a 
duty not recognized by law. 
The court's failure to instruct the jury as to assump-
tion of the risk, based on the court's opinion that assump-
tion of risk has been engulfed by comparative negligence, 
worked to deprive the defendant of a defense still recognizeo 
in Utah law, which if decided in defendant's favor, would 
have operated as a complete bar to plaintiff's action. 
In instructing the jury on proximate cause, the lower 
court acted contrary to law and pol icy. Under principles 
of Utah law, plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause 
(and possibly the sole proximate cause) of his injury. ~e 
court's denial of defendant's proposed instruction deprived 
defendant of a verdict to which it was entitled upon the 
applicable law and facts. 
Taken as a whole, the lower court's mistakes of law are 
1 The Cumulatl·ve effect was to de· not merely harm ess error. 
prive defendant of its theory of the case by removing de-
. 1 d b 1 The result fenses to which defendant was ent1t e Y aw. 
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was to deny defendant a fair trial of the issues. Justice 
demands that these errors be corrected. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By Ra~B-;rrf)., ·~ 
By_s:i:3.::P-C<- ~;;~ '2-l.-
Bruce H. Jensen, 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant Burton Lumber & 
Hardware Company 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 521-9000 
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